Abstract
In terms of religious practice, there is still a lack of reliable sociological data. However in 2006, 27% of the Muslim respondents said in a Gallup opinion poll that they attended 'religious ceremonies together with others' on a monthly basis or more frequently. 3 The 141 opposite figure of 31% stating that they never took part in such activities indicates a high degree of polarization among cultural Muslims when it comes to mosque affiliation and religious practice. In a different survey of immigrants' living conditions from 2005-6, in which different groups were asked to state the importance of religion in their lives (Tronstad 2008) , the Pakistani and Somali group are found at the higher end, followed by the Turks, with Bosnians and Iranians at the other end of the spectrum and
Iraqis somewhere in the middle. When asked how often they took part in religious meetings organized by faith communities, Pakistanis, Somalis and Turks again placed themselves at the top with Bosnians and Iranians at the bottom end.
As regards methodological approaches to Muslim attitudes and practices, the basic question is of course whether Muslim pluralism can really be captured by means of organizational mappings or survey questions about collective practices. Jacques
Waardenburg notes that in post-modern societies, religious identities have become increasingly personalized and plural in nature:
Leaving apart the influence of political and economic power, already the complexity of modern societies means that people now participate in several identities which are often juxtaposed to each other rather than being put in an hierarchical order (Waardenburg 2000: 159 The Muslim Nora 6 raised in Norwegian schools is now breaking free from traditional attitudes. We raise a struggle to realize ourselves as independent individuals, as Norwegian girls who have been taught to fight for gender equality.
Were it not for the fundamental influence of It is important to note that the Humanist Association has been a member of the interfaith council from the beginning and has also taken actively part in other multilateral dialogue projects. This has challenged both religious and non-religious dialogue partners to seek a faith-transcending language for one's commitment (cf.
Habermas' reflections on the requirement to translate religious concerns into a generally accessible language, as discussed in the introductory chapter of this issue). The titles of two formative interfaith dialogue projects in the 1990s are indicative of the search for a common ethical, human-rights oriented language which has also put its mark on Muslim discourses in Norway: 'Communal Ethics in a Multicultural Norway' (Eidsvåg and Leirvik 1993) and 'Religion, Life Stances and Human Rights in Norway' (Eidsvåg and Larsen 1997) .
Although the mentioned projects received some support from the authorities, they were initiated by interfaith activists. It should be noted that none of the regular dialogue forums listed above have come about because of government initiatives but they are 151 fully the result of civil society activism. State support for such activities is actually a relatively recent phenomenon in Norway (unlike for instance Great Britain and Germany, where the authorities have sought more actively to establish 'partnership' and 'dialogue' with Muslim faith communities in particular).
As for the bilateral Christian-Muslim Contact Group, the group's early agenda was much focused on Muslim minority concerns in Norway-for instance as regards religion in school and anti-Islamic tendencies in public debates. But over the years, the precarious situation of Christians in some Muslim countries has become an equal concern-as expressed in joint statements such as 'Stop the violence against Christians in Pakistan' (2009). 15 In recent years, the group has also shown a growing concern for individuals under pressure-as expressed in a milestone statement in 2007 on the inviolable right to conversion (which also caught international attention) 16 
Between identity politics and dialogue
In conclusion, the image of the Muslim population in Norway is becoming more and more complex. A wide array of cultural identities competes on the one hand with a growing sense of Norwegianness (in tune with mainstream value discourses in society) and on the other with Islamic identities which function as a form of 'symbolic ethnicity' 27 www.ungmuslim.no across national identities (Kastoryano 2004 . Minority discourses with a defensive touch among ordinary Muslims compete with a relatively strong commitment to interreligious dialogue among Muslim leaders, and the emerging Muslim establishment seems already to have fostered a more radical opposition.
As for the prospects of inter-group dialogue, one important arena deserves special mention, namely public schools and the subject of religious education that have been introduced at both primary and secondary levels. As mentioned above, Muslims have in general been quite supportive of the egalitarian 'one school for all' system in Norway.
However, the subject of religious education, which was made compulsory in 1996 for pupils in primary and lower secondary school, has created some tension. Muslims, other religious minorities as well as the secular humanists have criticized the subject for being 
